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*
SOURCES OF GTT.rn-:TE AND ST?-.UCTUI:AL Cl!AVGf 1947-1963 
Don L. i-;udd le 
I. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the structural change in, and growth sources of, manufac­
turing industry in postwar Brazil. The importance of a fairly systematic descr
ip­
tion and examination of manufacturin~ industry during this period is implicit i
n 
the contradictory hypotheses and assertions which abound in the literature on 
this 
subject. Horeover, the present analysis may help explain the several apparen
t 
First, althoush the rate of economic growthparadoxes found in postwar Brazil. 
has been very rapid, the fruits of increasing wealth seem to have eluded a va
st 
That the dynamic expansion occurred inproportion of both urban and rural labor. 
the industrial, rather than the primary sector and in the central-south as op
posed 
to the other regions helps explain part of the pattern of wealth distribution.
 But 
the rapid migration of labor into the dynamic centers should have partly offs
et the 
increasing regional dualism. On the contrary, however, labor migration seems 
to 
have created a new form of dualism, for the industrial sector absorbed few of t
he 
migrants. 
1 It instead adopted a capital-intensive technology and hastened the 
decline of labor-intensive cottage industry, both of which forced the unskilled
 
urban laborers into the parasitic services sector.
·2 
Second, after the long, 
sustained period of growth, the industrial sector lapsed by late 1962 into a 
vir­
Once again, there aretual stagnation which has continued to the present time. 
abundant explanations, but none of these have been linked empirically and syst
em~ 




This paper was r,iven at a •·colloquim · on the Hodernization of Brazil,
11 Feb-
ruary 23-25, 1967, at Louisian~ State University. The author is visiting resea
rch 
economist at the Economic GroHth Center, Yale Univcrsi.ty, and associate profe
ssor 
of economics at Rice University. Thanks c1re <l1,1e to professors Hiromitsu Kane
da 
and Al Berry who have served _;1s friendly critics. 
In what follows, an attempt is 1~1ade to explain c_ertain aspe
cts of the rise 
and ·ultimate demise of industrial· growth in Drnzil. Part II
 presents several widely 
held interpr~tations of the Brazilian :Lndustr.ialization, wh
ich· are examined in 
Part IV for their compatibility with the available evidence
. Althoul',h Brazilian 
data are poor in coverage and uncertain in quality, the app
lication of new tech­
niques in Part II to existing data-uncovers several enlighte
ning patterns which 
conflict with assumptions held widely in the literature on 
the industrialization. 
The final part attempts to set out a stylized interpretation
 of Brazilian indus­
trial development with the newly discoverec
1 patterns in rc1ind. 
II. · Interpretations cf the Industriali~ation 
Previous models of the rapid indt!strir;J.iz3tj_on in Brazil foc
us attention on 
the roles played by 1) inflation-inducec forced s~ving; 2) 
import.substitution; 
3) the sluggish international de1'.'!and for ::rr-.zil
I s exports (predcmin2ntly prtr.1ary 
products); and 4) foreign investr-.ent. At the r.-,ost gcnen,.l 
level, the model of 
Brazilian industrialization has been loosely <1s folloHs: 
11 
The government has 
I:m-,ever, expansion ofbeen committed to a high rate of r;routh for tLe economy. 
export earnings did not permit the target rc.te of grm,
1th to be achiev_ed in a normal 
pattern; so the country turned to i~port substitution to rea
ch its goals. Import­
substitution industrialization required t!1e government to ti
nker with the exchange 
system and expaud credit to~ the industrial sector. An incre
ased rate of inflation 
_necessarily resulted both from the reduction of wage and sa
lary (consumption) goods 
as a proportion of total imports (for which are substituted capital and intermediate 
inputs), and from an expansion of loans to the industrialis
ts. Income stabiliza­
tion of the coffee sector accelerated the inflation, but '7a
s not its sole cause. 
The inflation, however, was not harmful to the industrializa
tion, but actually 
-3-
favors it uy redistributing incor.ic from the consur.1inp. classes (wage and salary earn­
ers) to investing classes (entrepreneurs). Only ~1hen war;e nnd salary earners were 
able to keep tip wi tii the price increases did t!ie inflation becorr!e destructive. How­
ever, the disappcan:mce of price-wage laf':s is not believed to have been the sole 
growth-dissipatinf!: factor. Although Bner, for instance, seems convinced that the lag 
was important, he.places more emphasis upon both political problems and social 
inbalances as the causes of stagnation after 1962. 5 Furtado, on the other hand, 
. - . 6 
sees the price-wage la~ disappearing in the late 1950's, but also ·stresses 
political bottlenecks, the numerous errors he believes the authorities made in 
selecting infant industries for subsidies and protection, and the worsening 
. 7externa1 terms of traae. The rconomic Commission for Latin ;\merica cites a host 
of bottlenecks, includi1,;3 the lack of sufficient dor:iestic demand and the increasing 
harm don!:! by longer terr.1 absolute protection of industry. 8 
.Contradictory interpretations of the sources and patterns of growth abound 
in the literature. A few passages in the literature bring out ·this point. 
Furtado explains inflation's role as followE: 
''During the last three decades, industrialization has per­
sistently been supported by the convergence of.••. two factors: 
substitutio§ for imports, and transfer of resources caused by
inflation." . 
' 
1Inflation is u process of redistributing income, variously 
caused but ait,ays operatinp, for the benefit of groups linked to. 
investment." · · 
"Inflation played a major role in raising the investment 
rate and concentratinr; investment in the industrial sector. 
Without1fnflation, the rate of p,rowth would certainly have been lower." 
Baer is more cautious in hiE nssessment of the inflation than Furtado, but 
it still occupies a central place. 
" •.. the inflationary process is .:l n;:itun:.l concor.rnitnnt of a 
country \/hich faces continuously ,ieclinin:3 ir.iport carniags, which 
.. 4•. 
is committeJ to & :dg~; .:-nte r,f fi'm"t;,, ent'. 11::icl1 meets its 
externa] sit UC! ti an i::y ~ro-~ot ii~~ i:::r-ort-:~ ~n ~ ::r.'.·:r' 1"1~ t ind us tries and 
ne~-1 export in<:ustries. The fc:,ctiol"! of the lrflutionary !)rocess 
is to force tile cons~r.·ing ~;cc tor to •f;cive in 01.·c\::::· to rc,iuce 
imports replacenents. . .. f, la1; in \·.rar.es rmc: SF,laries is ... [l 12
sine qua non for m~kin;• the inflaticne.ry process a productive one. " 
He goes on to state that infl.:i.tion clid play a_ positive role in Brazil with.­
out having an obviously negative effect on social productivity. 
But the inflation eventually lost its virtues according to Furtado 
"Fr~m the moment when the terms of trade beg,m to deteriorate 
the only remaining source that could. feed inflation ,1i thout pro­
voking a spira] of prices and costs was lost. The government had 
to nbandon the tax.:ition of exports implicit in the difference of 
exchanr,e rates, and cover the lacL of reserve funds by further 
emissions of paper currency. Thus, inflation ceased to be an 
effective mechanisr.i. for the redistribution of income, anc! m£3e 
and more became simply a sterile ~ame of passing the buck..: · 
Opinions have differec ,·1idely rer,arding the incustrialization itself. Baer 
is probably most laudatory 
0 Because of the type of protectionist· policies e.ncourap,ing 
verticle interration, o fairly well h>1lanced in<lustri~l n:rowth 
took place; Indus tries •-d th high linka<7,es ~-1cre s tim1lated, and 
the linkages worked themselves out ti!rour,h the econom:r. This 
explains the rapid spread of the 'ir;dustrialization which resulted 
•••with industry h1zor:-!inp. the princ.ipr!l contributor to the gross 
domestic nroduct... -
"Policy measures ,;hicl: accompanied -protectionist actions 
produced an industrialization of considerable <lepth ..• so that 
in a short period of time most nanufac£~red products uere almost 
entirely produced within the country." . 
Furtado and the Economic Commission for Latin /\Merica do not disagree with 
the notion that Brazil had to follrn1 an import-subst:i.tution industrialization 
model, but each stresses errors mndc in its implementation 
! 
1A lack of a consistent policy of industrialization was the 
concentration of investment in 'less essential' industries. The 
less essential a procluct the more difficult Pas its import ..• there-
-5--
fore, sectors prc-t.iucia·' ~uxury "00c s :,nd t!,e r:reatest attrcction 
for investors. I::-i contrast, ti!e <leveloi:,r-,.-~nt. of the c.ipi tal ~oo<ls 
industry Has ceh:ye,:.:. 'lG " •.. inV•=Str.ent'.:: ir: i;:fr;:,,,tructurc and 
the basic indm;trj_es (iron nr,~d st-=e] fo1· ex.:n:-le) :!r!S :illo~-~ed1 
to l:!;~ behind bac!ly •.. tr.c ccono:::ic 8ystcr· ~-!~s Li:!dly un1Jalm,ced 
showinG excess capacity in som2 sectors, D.nd inadcc!UA.te ca-rncity 
~n others •.. to caintain a reasonable ~e,.,rce of utilizntion of 
productive capacity, <l~mandcu the raisinr. of tte level of exnenoiture 
(consumption plus invest1:12nt) uell ahove that of the incor:1e 
generateG by donestic production, e. process r-1hich is nossible only 
by incurrin~ a substantial margin of foreign indebtedness."17 
The Economic Comr;iission for Latin .America identifies the problems facing 
Brazil 
"Hetal transformin~ chemical, rubber, and transport equipment 
industries ure the only branches ... in uhich effective substitution 
is possible on a fairly large scale ... the first three sectors would 
require a high capi.tc1l investment for expansion of their productive
capacity. ;·1c 
11 
••• the crux of the problem is not the fr1possibility of con­
tinuinf with substitution, .but the fact t!1at the series of incentives 
created -have virtually lost all of their power. 1'19 
,; .•• the strategic problem confronting the r,r.?.zilian economy 
is to make the transition fron an ir:!port. substitution nodel to 
a self-sustaining growth ;noclel. .. Only the !)ublic sector •.• is capable 
of providing autonomous demand on a sufficient scnle to 
counte?:'b.nlance the negative effect of the exhaustion of the 
external stir.1ulus. · 0 20 
Many other conflicting opinions could be ciuote<l, but the above suffice t·o 
show the present state of disagreement. 
- III. The Patterns nn<l Sources of ?!::mufacturin~ 
This section attempts to analyze the patterns and sources of sector-r,rowth in 
manufacturing industry between 1939 anc1 1963. Since events far from homogenouswere 
during this long period, we distin~uished four subperiods: 1) 1939-1949; 2) 1949-
1953; 3) 1953-1958: and 4) 1958-1963, each of which represents widely varying r,ro,~th 
patterns, policy instrur.1ents and conr1itio11s, /1. brief su!'1mi'.ry of policy instruments 
and ihesc conditions in each perici~ ar~ inclu~e~ below. 
. ,., 1 22 
The ana],ysis of sect(.'rai ~rmith ::.:.!r?,el~; follous the Chcner.y"- , Lewis-Solir,o 
frameworks which separate out three sources •:Jf ~routh: 1) ir:iport substitution: 
2) domestic demand; an<l 3) exnort <ler-1.:ind. lmpcrt su~.,stitution is defined (as by 
Chenery) with referer..cC'. to the prop·ortio1; of inports in totnl supply. Import 
substitution is positive if c.onest:.'.c )Jr.-::-rluction rises nore rapidly than imports; 
negative import substitution (ir.port liber.:i1iu!tic,n) occurs if j_mports increase 
more than domestic production. 
Domestic procluction is apportioned to the three sources ,'1s follows 
(1) t:.,Z =L'.iX + f.il-.1 
where Z is defined as total supply, X as domestic nroduction, and ?t as in:ports 
(2) !:.,Q =6D + t:.,H + ll.E 
where Q i_s defined as total demand, D as domestic final demand, H as domestic 
intermediate demand, and E as foreign demnnd for exports. 
The system is closed by the demand-supply identity 
(3) 6Z = 60 
Because the data do not distineuish between clo~estic final demand and 
intermediate demand, these two elements arc combined into a single variable, 
and (2) becomes 
(4) . !:.,Q = t:.,(D+H) + 6E 
where (D+l-!) is total domestic demand. 
By combining these identity eriuntions, the relative importance of the three 
sources of growth can be calculated. Expression·s (1) and (4) become 
n-o-
Aithouch the ~ovcrnment di~ not actively pursue icport substitution, the 
unavailability of imn.orts c!urin;~ the :';:ir 0 avc domc•i~tic !)rociucers strong effective 
protection; ir.uncdintel:· after t',-2 :Tnr, r>rotect~oL \·!.DS ~reatJ~, reduced by irinort 
liberalization, but by the finnl twc years 6f the periof, incrcasin~ly pervesive 
exchan3e control i7itS re-ir:stituteci and protection 2gain incre2sed thour,h only as 
a by-product of balance of payments control. 
Table I - V provides the basis for the followin~ observations. All industrial 
sectors were advancing, uith investr,1ent ::mc1. relntec' goocs r,rowing r.1ost rapidly, 
followed by intermediate goods an<l consul'cer goods, respectivel.y. r~either export 
. expansion nor import substitution pl.<1~1ed a si~nificant role overall, although 
import substitution 1~.is of at least minor importance in paper products anLl netals, 
machinery and transport equipr;ient. By far the stron/jest source of ~rm-:th was 
domestic demand in all instances. ?:onavailability of iMports rnther than nurposeful 
protection stimulated rather lir.1ited substitution for ir:1ports. :r.ven the increasingly 
severe exchange control necessitated by a highly overvalued exchange rate made at 
best very limited provision for infar.t inclustry. ihus, substitution was limited 
largely because protection tJas only an accidental consequence of what was essentially 
a free trade oriented government. 
B. The Second Subperiod: 1949--1953 
Again there were conflicting trends. Although the. period was one of general 
foreign exchange shortar,e, the Kor·ean Uar helpecl induce a general import liberaliza-
·tion in 1951 an.dearly 1952: import controls uere ap,ain tip:htened in late 1952 
and 1953, hoHever, as foreign exchanr,e reserves became exhausteC:. By the end of 
the period; inflation began to accelerate due partly to reduced import availability 
and increased government spendil:p,. Also, \,ages ancl :rnlar:i.es .iu"1ped precipitously, 




(5) tJ.X + 6i: = ti (D-HJ) + t.E 
(6) ~X = ti (DH!) + ti[ - ifri 
The contribution of ~0:1:eslic de111and· anc1 export c!evwnd to domestic r,roduction 
durinB any given period 'i' is therefore 
.x. X. 
1(7) LlX. = _!_ • Ll(D+H) + - • Z?
21 zi 1 -
where X. is the contribution of the ·2emand factors to the increr.ient in domestic 
1 
production. T!1e contribution of ir:1port substitution to ciomestic production is 
V X"2 1. 
tiX. . = (- - -;-) : z





is the contribu"tior: of clor.estic production t0 the increment in total 
supply and the subscripts refer to two tine periods. 
By combining (7) an<l ( C) t!ie total contribution of· c:or.:estic demand, export 
demand, and import subr.tituti.011 is four.cl as 
.(9) t.X = t.X . + l.i.X . . = Z 
1 :u. 1 
In what follows, output grcwth patterns aric'. · froutl, sources are discussed for 
each subperiocl between 1939 and E'C3. Tnhles I - III sum:uirize the rates of out­
put growth, and the :>roportion of ir.iports and <lornestic production respectively, to 
·total supply. Tables IV ancl V shoh the results of ·calculation using expression 
(9) to apportion growth among the three sources in terr1s of ~ross output. The 
latter seems methodologically superior to value ac~deL1. TJith resr,ect to empirical 
evaluation of the dynamics of import substitution. 
A. The First Subperiod: 1939-1949 
Two conflicting trends·occurre<l during this subperiod. Between 1939 and 1946 
the wartime unavailability of inports arid exchanr;e control greatly biased the pro-
cess of production and trade. Then for several years folloHing .the rn:ir there was 
substantial import liberalization which was folloi-,ed by increasinp,ly rcstricitive 
23
import licensinr, and exchan~c control up to JSl49. 
··HJ-· 
. 1. • , 26 ·durine tue present p~r10~. ?'.rn71erot·s cc·ncesr;ion; Pere r.:.:de · ii: the uay of guarantees, 
favorable exchange treatment, etc. 3y 1963, however, foreiR;n investment hacl fallen 
to the low levels of the early 1S50's. SeconC:, the rate of inflation dangerously 
accelerated. At the same time t:~e resignatior. of President 0uac.lros anc the np­
pearante of numerous social and economic imbalances raised ~uesticns of political 
and soc1.a. 1 d"1.scontent. 27 By the end of this period, alriost nll-of the factors 
favorable to expansion seemed to clissipnte as indicated by: 1) acceleratinR infla­
tion without forced saving: 2) disincentives to forei~n invcstr.1ent; 3) stagnant 
export earnings; 4) social unrest and demands for drastic reforr1s; and 5) weak 
and vacillating leadership. 
Although the over-ell rate of ~rowt~. in ir,clus try incrc.cJs 
0 
e::l, several sectors 
which had been instrur1entnJ in lc,'.'tli:1'.? the exp~nsion t:urin"' tbe previous period per-
ceptibly slowed; e:-:pancin:; sectors ~-:er':' :~:ainly !:Lose intimately connected to the 
automobile boom and foreir;n invest:nent. ,Ut~10ur,! ir:port sut,stitution in general was 
slightly greater th,m during the p-r,2.·.Jious period, import su,istitution became 
negative in four major sectors. The relative ~ain in substitution occurrecl in 
intermediate goods industries. Domestic demand again ~e;~an to rise in magnitude 
as the source of growth in consum(~r goods anc investment 1-:md related goods while 
export demand fe•ll in ·every sector. 
E. Some Tentntive Conclusions 
The empirical analysis clears up several misconceptions re3arding Brazil's 
industrialization. Accor9ing to Furtado, over the past three decades import 
substitution has been inseparable frooi the industrial{zation itself. In fact, 
__ ... _ 
i:r. tiie cc.rlier neriocl. i·'um-The growti, rai:e in =-::.:~rn!fJ.ctu:dc.:·, fe}l rel.:1t:ive 
erous bottlencc!:s inhihited ex:u11,~;ion, e.r;., short~lc'!r~
s of !J01-Jer ant' loanable funds, 
as a source of grm-~th ..io:,h'.;:;.te~'. COI"!:,let:el:: · ir':JOrt su
bstitution ups sinni fican t only 
l}00Js inc!ur;tr~e;s. In consumer and intermecli.:ite produ
ct
in the investment and rel.:1te,
1 
industries, there was inport libcr.nl:i.zRtion e}:cept in
 the cherr:ical_, petroleun and 
coal products sector. Export denand was insignifican
t in all .sectors. 
C. The Third Subperiod: 1953-195[ 
Policy instruments uere more uniform and exof.enous sh
ocks less important 
than during any of the previous periods. The governm
ent undertook a relatively 
systematic program of subsidies-t~xation And protecti
on designed to promote 
rapid expansion of selected industrial sectors. ?for
eover, it undertook to provide 
added social overhead capital for industry fr1 renera
l. Inflation continued, but 
not b~yond the lirait which could be considered as unc
ontrolled or dangerous. 
25 
The growth rate of industrial producticn accelerated 
relative to the previous 
period. For the first time, import substi.tutior, beca
ne a source of gro\1th in 
every sector, even consumer goods whicL regcinecl e.~r
lier losses caused hy import 
Hith several individu.nl exceptionri, exrort deir..'.lnc! pla
yed c> very
liberalization. 
small, though positive, role. Domestic c:enand, on the
 other hand, remained the 
prime source of expansion for nll sectors. 
D. The Fourth SuLperiocl: 195:-~-1%2 
Policy instruments of the previous period still predO
l!linated, and yet several 
important changes affected the operation of the econo
r.1y. The first of these was 
the all-out drive for foreign capital investment intiT
11ntely connected to the 
f'J",d nt tir:•cs ncn.ative Priorimport suustitution. as a .-,_rc,·1t!~ courc0 w.:s r·c,~:,n· 
to 1953 (see Tnbles II .:ind IV). ~hit rieit!.cr j~ the :o:•verse
 statement hy Baer 
accurate. 1.ianuf2cturinr: proJucts '?ere not nE:wJ., .,roc.·-uc3d l.!1:
tirely inside nrD:~il 
in a very short time, for this had ~lready been true vith the excep
tion of chemi-
. 2r-
cals, paper, metals, and transport products by 1939 {see Table II). · 
The pr0sent 
analysis would also appear to vitiate the clair hy Furt~do t
hat infant industry 
protection led to substitution in less essential products su
ch as consumers' 
durables anJ luxuries rather thr:m in '.1er.vy ir..dustry. The IS
IC clnssification 
is someuhat misleading, '.1m-Iever, for it includes co:nsur1.er du
rables such as re-
investment and relatedfrigerators, television sets, passen~er -~1utos, etc., r>s 
goods. Passenger autos 0ecc.me z. pcrticulc,rl:,r significant substit
ution item after 
1953, and raises probler,,,s of interpretf'tion 1-1hich are <liscussed 
in 'Part IV. The 
other durables, however, were insufficiently lf'r;;e ;::,ncl c,m b
e if!:nored. Thus, the 
sequential pattern of import substituticn was not completely
 of the clnss:i.cal 
although c01:1sumer ~oods, cnpi tell '.iOods, and inten'lediate goo
ds, respec-
type= 
tively were substitutec! for ir.ports, 
1 durablc' consurr;er goods becarae a rnajor sub-
stitution item <luring the final two periods. 
The figuras in Tables I, II anc~ IV point ur the basic dissimilarities 
of 
sectoral expansion during the final two perio<ls (1953-58 and
 1959-63). Sectoral 
growth and substitution were apportionet1 fairly evenly amonr
 all manufacturing 
sectors <luring the former perioc'. whereas ir: the latter perio
d, the converse 
This dichotomy (larp-cly overlooLed ir:. the liternture) is the
 primary
occurred. 
clue to the roots of the post-19G2 stapnation; it is examine~ norc tho
roughly 
in Part IV. 
What do these results iTllpl~,' 'for future _import substitution i
n Drazil? The 
data of Tables I - V clearly clenonstratc that import· substitu
tion h8d already 
-12-
been carried very far by 1939. Thus, continued import substitution l1ctFeen 
1939 and 1963 w;;.s necessarily someuho.t lL.ited. That wilich did occur, however, 
. 
absorLe<l to a· 1arge extent the rcr.1&ining substitutic,. pcssil:iliticc. Cver 
the next decade more than r!inor substitution could occur only in chemicalsj 
t_ransport equipmc'!nt (includinr,petroleum, coal products, Aetals, machinery, c1rn1 
durable constuner p,oods). Even in these sectors, 'potential' substitution is 
less than was 'actual' substitution betHeen 195:3 and 1963 (Table II). /m 
effort directed to\lard t2king full ?.clvanta~e of thi.s limited potential suosti­
tution is very questionable, for it would imply that a state of autarl;y would be 
preferable to some trade. Phile internetion<1l tr~cle theory cannot demonstrate 
that 'more' .trade is better th::n ;-1~•~;s 
I trade, it car;not !:,e:: cfoubtecl that 1 sorne 1 
trade is better than complete c:utark~,. Since 0razi~. alre::idy has one of the low-
to increase trade alone appropriateest import coefficients in the world, efforts 




Growth Rates of Manufacturing Industry 
ISIC Industry
No. Sector 1939-48 1948-53 1953-58 1959-63 
Consumer Goods 
.20-22 Food, beverages and
tobacco 4.5 8.9 7.1 2.4
24- Clothing 4. (> 5.1 9.3 0.9
25-2~ Wood Products . 13. 7 6.6 2.8 0.8
28 Printing 3.6 10.5 7.5 3.7
:- · . 29 Leather Products 1.3 2.4 5.4 0.3 
Intermediate Goods 
23 Textiles 4.1 2.4 3.1
27 Paper 9.2 7.5 11.0
30 Rubber 14.5 5.7 1.1
31-32 Chemicals, petroleum
and coal products 10.2 10.7 9.6 
I~vestment and Related Goods 
33 Non-metallic minerals 11.9 12.7 4.4 1.2
34-38' Metals, machinery and
equipment 13.5' 4.1 13.9 .21.0 
Total Manufacturing 11.6 5.3 7.0 8.0 
Source: United Nations, The Growth of World Industrv, National Tables
1938-1961, Table 2B data for 1959-1963 were calculated
from IBGE/Conselho Nacional De Estatistica, Anuario Estatistico
Do Brasil, 1966, Rio ..de Janeiro, Brasil, p. 130. ISIC No.'s 25-26,
31-32, and 34-38 were not listed in Table 2B, United Nations;
these were calculated from value added data above and deflated
by price•indices from Internation Financial Stntistics, wholesale
prices excluding coffee; and Conjunctura Economica, sectoral price
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Proportion of .Domestic' Produ











INo. Sector ill§. 12.ll I-
.9913 .9896 .9726 .9918 .9901 lConsu.-uer goods ' 
.9676 .9917 .9338 l
20-20 Food, beverages and .9
880 .9858 •·t 
I 
i
tobacco 1. 0000 I1.000 1.000 .9996 1.000 
I 
24 Clothir,g .9931 1.000 l.COCO I 




1.000 1.000 .9655 .961528 Printing II
. 29 Leather products 1.000 1.00
0 .9780 1.000 l. 0000 t
f,·
.9157 i.8618 .8817 .8376 .8619Intermediate goods l
I 
i
•96l+9 .9666 .9733 .9960 .9947 'I23 Textiles .7459 .8538 •8172- .8383. .9205 iI27 Paper .9736 jI
_30 iubber 1.000 
1.000 .9963 l.000 
.8567 
..
l.6891 •7313 .6605 .7456
31-32 Che..1icals, petroleum and i:.:
coal products .7223 .8218 .3931.5701 ~6666 
-Investment and Related goods .9755.9305 .9095 .9333 .999333 Non-metallic minerals .6097 .6532 .7943 .8829
34:-38 Xetals, machinery, and -
.5053 
transport equipment 
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TABLE III 
Proportion of Exports to Do~estic Production E 
X 
ISIC Industry 
~ Sector 1938 19/;9 1953 1953 1963 
Consumer Goods .0092 .0096 .0106 .0209 .0128 
20-22 Food, beverages and .0125 .0120 .0140 .0302 ,0171· 
tobacco 
24 Clothing .0000 .0000 .0001 .0000 .0000 
25-26 t.Jood Products .0000 .0000 .0014 .0000 .0049 
28 PrintinP, .-0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
29 Leather Products .0041 .0276 .0144 .0000 .0000 
Intermediate Goods .0083 .0137 .0057 .0245 .0149 
23 Textiles .0124 .0226 .0037 .0308 .0241 
27 Paper .0000 .0000 .0010 .0000 .0000 
30· Rubber 
31..:32 Chemicals, petroleum and. . 0000 · .0000 .0119 .0267 .0122 
coal product;s 
Investment and Related Goods .0000 .0000 .0005 .00~1 .0023 
33 Non-metallic minerals .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
34-38 Metals, machinery, and .0000 .0000 .0007 .0037 .0026 
transport equipment 
Total .00l19 .0092 .0071 .0168 .0100 








Sources of Growth 
19l19 - 531939 - 49 
Import Dor.1estic ImportISIC Domestic
Demand ~xports Substitution Demand E
xports Substitution
-1!£!.. 
V <x3 x2)Xl Xl (x2 x1)• x2 "2.z • /j (6+H) - oE ·--- ·Zz .. 6(D+H) 2 · 6E (Z2·- - -Zl) 2 z2 z2 (Z3 z2) 3 1 1 
f).X 6X 6X6X 6X 6X 
· .- · Cons.umer .0115 -.0350
-goods ·• 9924 .0096 -.0020 1.02
32 
' .0118 -.0026 1.0223 .0157 -.038020-22 - .9908 
24 1.0000 .0000 .0000 1.0005 
.0003 -.0009 
.0000 1.0114 .0028 -.014225-26 1.0000 .0000 
28 1. 0000 .0000 .0000 l.056L;
 .0001 -.0566 
29 .9670 .0330 .0000 1.0618 
-.0054 -.0563 
Intermediate 1.1057 -.0018 -.1041goods .9590 .0140 .0270 
1. 00li7 -.0207 .016023 .9716 .0264 .0021 
27 .8548 .0000 .1451 1.0715 
•001/1 -.0730 
.0000 1.0052 • 0002 -.005530 1.0000 .0000 
1.1759 .0155 .191431-32 .9317 .0000 .0663 
Investment
and Related.
goods .8346 .0000 .1656 .8666 
.0006 .1328 
33 1.0263 .0000 -.0263 .9613 .0
000 .0387 
34-38 .8037 .0000 .1962 .8767 
.0008 .1224 
\ . 
1.0220 .0045 -.0265Total .• 9527 • 0084 .0387 
See Appendix A; the methodology for the growth source 
calculation
Source: 
is adapted from H. Chenery, "Pattern of Industrial Grow
th" American 
Economic Review, September, 1960, pp. 624-54, · and S, Le
wis and R, 
Se,i..i,ga,, "Growth and Structural Change in Pakistan's Ha
nufacturing 
Industry, 1954-64," :Pakistan Development Review, Sprin








· Part B 
Sources of Growth 
1958 - 63 .1953 - 58 
·1s1c Domestic · Import . .Domestic 
Import 
Exports Substitution Demand Exports Substitutio-;-.No. Demand 
X3 . x3 Cx4 x3) X4 . X4 (XS - Xli) 
- •t,(D+H) -(t.E) z z . .6_(D+W) -(t.E) z5
z3 z3 (Z4 - 'Z3) :4 4 Z4 
(ZS Z4) 
AX AX . tiXAX AX AX 
Consumer .• 0117 -.0019goocls .9417 .0270 .0322 .9902 
-·. 0033 
..20-22 .9181 .04
05 .0416 .9879 .0154 
24 .9995 .0000 .0006 1.0000 .0000 
.0000 
25-26 .9903 -.0006 .0104 •9944· .0056 
.0000 
.9912 .0000 .0088·28 1.0080 .0000 -.0084 
29 .9745 -.0062 .0317 1.0000 .0000 .0
000 
Int~rmediate
goods .9311 .0270 .0400 .-9227 .0119 .0654 
.0231 -.004223 .9202 .0445 .0353 .9811
•.9003 .0000 .099427 ;9659 -.0003 .0345 
30 .-9941 -.0001 .0060 1.0284 .0017 -.0303 
.8497' .0081 .142331-32 .8329 .0204 .1468 
Invei=:tment
and Related
goods ; .8429 .0028 .1544 .9105 .0018 .0877 
33 . .8859 .0000 .il41 1.0278 .0000 -.0277 
34-3s· .7819 .0034 .2156 .8880 .0020 .1097 
.0447Total .-9403 .0185 .0413 .9467 .0082 





V. An Evaluation of the Indu~tri~lizatiori 
This section attempts ta provi(1e n stylized :::;yr:t;,esis cf the Brazilian 
industriLJlization. Previous ,•ut:;ors h.we ei',p;1.::sizcd the l.:ey roles playec
1 by 
inflation, exchDn~e cor.trol, inter-ir;llu~:try linkares, r.nd the terms of trade. 
theTheir assessment of t!?e ~rocess by uhich these variables operated on economy, 
however, often has been v.'.lgue and ir:.:.i.cr,urD.te. :?rcviot!S studies have differed 
also in their assessment of the success of the industrialization. For instance, 
industrial gon,tll has been characterizeci as both balanced (Baer) and unbalanced 
(Furtado); cl1oices made by the r;overnr.tent have been eveluate<l as goo<l, thou~h 
relatively unplanned <=~er), e.ncl .::.s poor (Furtado), etc. In what follows, these 
and other aspects of the industrialization are analyzed. 
After 1953 the govcrn!'lent uns the central force behind t!1e industrialization. 
During the-early postwar ye.s.rs the govermwnt greatly influenced the course of events 
also, but much less comprehensively and su<;:cessfully. Only after the exchange 
control systeE was- drastically improved in October 1S53 anc! large-scale financing 
of industric::1 activities commenced did the rnanufacturinp, sector beein its 'tal~e off'. 
Table V demonstrates the power •;..1hich the government exercisec. during these. years. 
of an import in either the favorel~ or the penalty cater,ory determ.inedThe placement 
the viability of all irnport-competinr; domes.tic activities. Favorecl sectors could 
import capital and internecliote goods at one-fifth to one-sixth the exchange cost 
of other sectors. The former also received absolute protection from foreign 
wascompetito_rs. A seconcl najor weapon of t!:c authorities control of finance 
capital. Loans of the nonetary ~uthorities nnd the rational Development Dank rose 
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continuously in renl terrr:s, and up tc 1959 were equivalent in a~ount to 'total' 
private· fixed c2:pitnl investncnt in industry. Other source::; of funds for long­
term investments 11ere comp2rc:,tively ins:tr-nific,mt. Cor;;-:··ercial b.nn:~s ty!")icnlly 
loaned short-tern and the cnpitnl marl,et uas too under<levelope<l to provide funds 
on any scale. Retained earninrs, on the otlier h~nci, were fairly small until 1959. 
Finally, the p,overnment be cane ae incrensinfly in,portant uirect investor. By 1962, · 
new government fixe<l investncnt surpassecl that of t~e private sector. In the last 
two columns of Tnble VI are sho~-m tLe ncn-infla~ionary soi.:rces of ·:overnT:1cnt expendi- · 
ture. 
'flm facts are pro::iinent ir, th~ context. of incius trial ~routh .'.!nc import sub-
stitution in :'.3razil. First, bt:'tm,:cn E'53 an<1 1952, hoti1 t:.~e ·rate of ?routh and 
import substitution <1s a t:ource of gro,-~!:r1 '.-,ere 11ir,h c:m<l ,e~,sonnbly 1~ell apportioned 
among all manufacturing sectors (see T.:-i.lllcs I .::.m,; IV). Seconc!, 2fter 105t: thif3 
balance ,ias lost .:mcl rap:i.<l ~;Tmv·t:1 tm<~ subctitu':ior: ~;ere cor;finecl to several in­
dustries--TTtetals, machinery m:.d tntr-.spcrt equipr~,cnt, ;:,n<l in cl:crl!icals and paper 
industries (see T.:cble IV). These fo.cts tend to contradict the notion that the 
impetus of industrialization was lost .::s soon 2E". t. 11e ter!'ls 0£ trade turned against 
Brazil in 1954 (Furtado), or only •-1hen sod.al fribi,lai:ccs and political uncertainties 
arose in the early 196C 1 v (Baer). Only after E5f'. did there e>.rise excess capacity 
in some sectors (textiles, household appliances, tranvport materials and light 
equipment) and· under capacity in others (basic metallurgical, chemicals, rubber and 
. 30 
paper). 
In my opinion, these ·developments uere not primarily~ consequence of either 
reduced price-war,e la3s or the worsening external tenns of trade. Price-wage lags 
-20-
per se have·never been demonstrably impor~ant. ·The data do not reveal a 
As Baer notes, hm.,ever, since taxes were very regressive andprice-wage la~. 
rising, sizable income transfers ·could have occurred. This hypothesis cannot 
be tested since data on tax incidence and rer,ressity are unavailable. In Appendix B, 
~n indirect test under various assur.iptions show that the data are inconsistent 
with the notion that regressity led to traasfers which significantly raised the 
saving rate. Given that the savings coefficient did not increase in Brazil despite 
rapidly rising incoo~, eith~r the re~istrihution effect was small or entrepreneurs' 
marginal savings rates we:·e litt:0. higLer thc.1.1 t'.:e ,_.nr;0 ar.c1 sr-~.ary earner's; or 
alterriative:y otl:er u:,identL:iec1 fc-::~o:··s rec>.•ce:l tr,,;isfers/s2v:.ngs. One decisive 
point is undispule:d---tI-,:a governneut fi:-:mcecl incustry in nr, amour:.t equivalent to· 
total fixed capital forr.-ation in it:,.:1us!"ry b2t~-;een 1953 .:,:·.d 1958 (Table VI). 
Although industry's l'Se of t~,e.se ftmds is inr!etc-rminant, it is clc~r that they 
constituted an important soc1rc::: of subsi<lj_z<cd fj_r.ancinp, alternative to saving out of 
current profits. Firms finar.ced so generously r.i.ay well i!ave · reduced saving out of 
profits, which l7o:ild help C;.X;:>lGin th~ absence 0£ a rising saving coefficient for 
31
the economy. 
An alternative explanation of the rise ccn<l fall of industrialization in 
Bra~il might go as follows: the manuractu:::-inr, sector responded strongly to the 
L!-1.:.. gu\len-..ne:L,::. d1rough the exchauge system which·,7.:i~ious incentives pro'. lJcJ .,J 
zreatly rais.!d the mareinal efficiency of investment. The inflation essentially 
operated so as to transfer resources from other sectors of the economy to the 
gov~rnment; in turn the governr.ient lent these resources to favored industrial sectors. 
Although price-wage lags per se were unimportant, domestic infant industries pro­
fitably expanded~ These firms--oligoplists and monopolists with a protected 
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domestic markct--receiveJ govern::ient loan sul:.H,idics •·:'.lich avera~ed from 20 to 30 per 
cent of total industrial profits (to the 1:a.;0:-~d industries r.uch r.iore). 
32 
Only by th~ late 1950 's cid. unfo,.rorable fol:tcrs Hppear. The first of these 
was- the not unnatural phenomenon of risir.r, r.osts in the subsidized sectors. As 
the industrializ;:tion wide;.i."!d, ti1e original infant indus trie•s had to purchase more 
and more inputs from ne,-! high cost infants. These later protected infants were 
of unre ble . oea, dl · an · fications.· 
33 The olderten 1 ia. in meeting. quotas, _ines, d speci 
industries tried to offs~t th~ threat to their price-cost structures through verticle 
integration, but this uas a pallat:..ve for the firm an<l -.i.ot the economy. Second, 
incomes began to be redirected to the_for~erly nerlected, penalized sectors (agri­
culture and wage earners). This redistribution operated partly throuf>:h normal 
market forces. F.:ir i;i.stance, productivity in the primary sector tended to suffer 
t1.s a coftsequen.:e of relative unprofitability. As production lagged, and could 
:,.ot be offset by larger inports, primary product prices began to rise. ·Also, as 
prices of wage g<;>o"ds began to· rise, workers were able to demand and receive higher 
,mge2. The interplay of these forces--urbanization, risin3 incomes, and relatively 
ccn!'tant productivity in the primary sector--~reatly reduced the amount of .re­
sources which could be transferred to industry. By 1956, government transfers to 
industry were increasingly offset by the irctersectoral shift in the terms of 
34trade. Efforts to neutralize this development through price control,s and export 
35
rPs_trictions on primary products were unsuccessful. Instead, these measures 
red 1 to 1.mp0rt• c.rove t h exc . i imports. 
36 
t1ain. 1y uced t 1e capacity• and ' up e hang-~ pr ce of · 
Partly because 0£ t:1e a"!.>ove d.rcum;:; t~1,ces, the govern,--:1ent shifted its efforts 
toward large-scale substitution i11 t:ie a_toMoti·:e sec.tor. Tl-irour,h m 1TUerous 
inducements, foreign m;d c!o::- ,:;s'.:5 c in ·:.:;:..•1~·s ~ ,crensec! t.hf! c1.0mcstic coefficient of 
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TABLE V 
lndjcators of Government Influence on Indust
ry 
, 
Private Industry's Govern::-.ent' s:Loans to Industry bY-:Exchange R~tes For: 
(bll. 's of 19l19 er.' s) (bil.'s of 1949 cr.'s)_{cr.'s per US$) {bil.'n of 1949 cr.'s) 
(9) {10)(5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) * (2) (3) (4) 
--· BNDE Fixed RetainCd Fixed Exchange 
Other
Total MonetaryFavored Penalty "Investment Revenue Revenue
Imports Imports Authorities ln
~estment Earnings
Imports 
10 .8 12. 5.5 9.1 l
1. 7 
1953 40 195 49 47.77.3 10.4 3.012.3 .8 13.
1954 55 200 62- 9.6 -.1 46.0
55· 340 114 12.3 .8 11
. 7.3
1955 
320 112 12.2 .8 13
. 6_. 7 9.2 3.7 47.2 
1956 70 14.5 4.4 51.-6
70 · 310 88 13.5 .6 
14. 6.4
: 1957 
14 •.5 1.5 19. 9.6 18.1 
4.0 62.7 
1958 80 360. . 152 14.0 17.6 .7. 68.313.3 .9 21.1959 120 320 203 81.420.7 10.5
450 228 13.2 1.9 30. 
20.2
1960 120 20.7 73.1
620 240 14.0 .9 27. .,1961 120 70.02li • 25.516.6 • 3
1962. 
*<1> 'Cost of exchange' plus ofHc:i.al rate as of A
ug. 1, of each year. 
(2) Category V plus official rate as of Aug. 1 b
etween 1953 and 1957; special category rate plu
s official 
rate between 1958 and 1961. Tariffs became importa~t after 1957, but are uo
t 
(3) Weight~<l average exchange rate plus off
icial rate. 
included because of dnta unavailability. 
(4) to (10) in 1949 prices; G.N.P. dcflator. Therefore frcm total investment, industrial· 
(6) Sectoral investment data arc not availab
le for Brazil. 
cJS:rnming that its incre111ental capital output 
ratio was fifty per ~ent 
i1Lvestmcnt had to be cstimatc<l i..,y 
hiP..hcr than the T.CffR.for the entire economy. 
This assumpti.on is consistent with industr:ta
l ICOR's found 
in other i.ndustdali.zing ·0l'.onomics. 
Retained carnin~s in industry were estimated 
by deducting the commercial sector's share o
f total 
(7) 
retained carnin~s·by its wcighteri nhnru of p
roduct. 
. (9) · .Net of exchange carni.ngs used to purcha
se coffee. 
(3) nanco de BrMdl; (!,), (5) & (9) calculate
d from llolctim Su1~crintcndcncia
Source: Co]umns (l) - (7), (8), and (10), )levlsta Brasileira de Eco
no:-iia, ·
((,),clc• Mcwd:,~; e Cret1Ho, July ]9(1(,; 
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total supply of notor vehicles frorr. ,.-,bout .l12 in 195f' to .9i) in 1963. 
37 These 
coefficients overstate the extent pf inport substitution, hmrever. Imports 
of 
accessories increased in value rou;::;hly in pro;"lortion to motor vehicle produ
ctior. ·. 
moreover (backward linl,.ed) supplying industries, e.g., iror"! nn<l steel, mach
ines 
and equipment, rubber, etc., !'equireci higher inports in orc1cr to meet automoti
ve 
demand. In addition, the i:1.assive pu!3h in motor vehicles '1ay have entailed h
igh 
social costs. Govermaent switching of fir.ancial and fore:i.gn exchange resou
rces 
from the more traditional and early infants to motor vehicles an~ related in
dustries 
caught .the former sectors in a debilitating squeeze which \·1as accentuated a
fter 
The much1957 by the worsening domestic terres of trade (sec Table V and Fn. 34). 
greater availability of passenger autos after 1952 (comprising 2.bout half o
f 
. 38 ....
vehicle production) d1m1.n1sned domestic demand for products of industries
 unlinked 
to the newly favored industries. Since many of these unfavorcc sectors alre
ady had 
excess capacity, reduced <lemand for their products resulted i11 lower r,rowth
 rates; 
the wisdom of making ava.ilable and subsidizing passenger autos in parti.al su
b-
stitution for the products of the neglected sectors seems questionable in te
rms of · 
39 Finally, the suhstitution for importsboth consumption and foreign exchange use. 
of domestically produced tractors and other prinary sector inruts did not ten
d to 
reduce costs and increase agricultural prod~ctivity. 
40 Therefore, cost-push 
inflation and dualism were aggravated •. 
In· retrospect, the new industrialization strateey in 1957~58 had high oppor
­
If policy had been focused instead on removing disincentives in thetunity costs. 
agricultur~l and export sectors, while retaininr, the incentives earlier giv
en to a 
broad spectrum of manufacturing industriQS, the nost-1962 sta~nation, as we
ll as 
incrensinc unemp laymen t r.nc! undcrer-1p 1oyr:C'nt, night he.Ve been nvertecJ.. The 
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industrializntion had many anti-employnent bio.ses, s_ome of which were natural given 
the ·greater ~roductivity of capital-intensive teclmi~ues in many lines. The.=' fact 
that substitution and rapit! c•.xn:msion ~-4ere centered i.n capital anc: intermediate 
goods after 1952 also ::ieant that the industrialization l~oulc1 be skewed touarcl 
capital-intensive factor proportion. I,ut capital intensive factor use was un­
necessarily encouragec in tl·:o ,rays, 1) import subsidies e~~cludcd labor (a non­
traded good internationally) nnd \}ere net of:csct by domestic subsidies for labor use; 
2) ·sectors favored by the ~ovcrnment, especially after 1957-53, tended to have 
higher capital/labor ratios than ot'.1er wmu:.'.:acturing in<.iustrJes though not notice-
ably· higher productivity. Alt!1ough the ar:ti-ernployner..t biases of these develop-
ments micht have been offset if ti~e production and incor.ies <;:re.,,,te<l had caused a 
heightened demand for high productivity services antl primary products, the contrary 
seems to have occurred. r\Tllile labor force growth in services rtore than doubled 
that of industry, productivity in the former sector actually declined between 1950-
41
60; agricultural workers fared little better. - The <lat·a (8.dr..ittedly incomplete) 
indicate that ·the factor share of labor fell over time; and along with it the 
42 
distribution of income probably became more unequal. In welfare terms, ·these 
findings imply that the fruits of rapid GNP growth and industrialization in the 
Brazilian instance may well have bypassed the unskilled, working-aRe masses. It is 
particularly in this sense that the.economic events of the postwar years in Brazil 
_have been so disappointing. 
VI. Conclusions 
The empirical findings of this ?aper hav~ dispelled some of the vague and 
contradictory ;,.ssertions regc.rding the r.rczilin!l ir.dcs trialization. However, 
the present study ha~; .::i.lso fouud it neccssrry tc r,o bcycrn! d1c!t can be finnly 
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established empirically. Any reasonably complete evaluation and interpretation 
of the import-substitution industrialization in Brazil must be sonewhat specu­
lative and intuitive, for there· are as yet no nenns available for c1-ccessing com­
pletely the incentives and disincentives provided by the government.· Nor can 
either the size of intersectoral transfers or the long run 'dynamic comparative 
advantage of the industries artificially created be neasure<l. 
Although only more reliable and extensive data Pill clarify many specific 
issues, the neccssc:ry conc~ition for increased lon·;-run soci2.l welfare in Brazil will 
most probably he radicEl refon1 i.:1 the primary sector, rat!1er than heavily subsi­
dized import-substitution in!u·:::t:;:-iaJ.ization. The present ,~r.vern:n~nt is anparently 
aware of the many cor.!plex r,robler.~s 0.-1i1icl1 it f.::-.ces--'.;;roiiin; un0~rloyment and under-
employment especially in the ur'.·,a:, cer,ters for uns·:ilJ.ed J.abor, inequitable income 
· distribution, and low productivity ,:,...riculture. '..'het!:er it ,.i_lJ_ have the political 
courage and means Hit:1 Hhic'.1 to ir.,JJle:.:ent. t;1e bas:i.c r,?.for'.:!s ~,hich will. necessarily 
be unpopular wi~h- powerful landed ar.c.'. i.ndustrid c-lii:'!urcr-.s is another question. 
Up to now, the increased ~-.1elfc1re of : os p0vos' has been only an incidental byproduct 
of the industrialization ,-:ith mea0re results. To !"emedy hoth the poverty and the 
fragmented nature of the economy, houever, nay vell require decisions which are 
innovative and revolutionary in character: 
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'J'al·les n 
1. Data on value added nnci gross output for t:1e yc,1rs ].<) 39-195[. 1.:ere tnken fror.1 
United f:ations, The Grout!: of Y'orlr: Industry, EJ'.,-19CJ, TDl:J.es !1.C (p. 73) and 
6 (p. 78): 1963 data uas- taken fro~- IBG]~/Coni,elho ~:acior.,rl de i~stntistn Anuario 
Estatistico Do ~rasil. 1966, Rio de Janeiro (p. 130). Gross output data was also 
taken from G. Loeb, Industrialization <.1ncl Ee.lanced r:rm-,th, 1.:alters/Croningen, 
1957, p. 91. 
Data on Forei~n Trcde t·1ere computed fro:;i Unite<.? t:atior:.s, Yearbook of Inter­
nationnl Trade Statistics, various years, and Anu~rio Estn.fistico Do Tirasil, 
various dates. 
2. Imports and exports were converted from U.S. dollars into cruzeiros by using 
the ratio of manufacturin~ prices in Jrnzil relc1tive to those in the United States 
beginning fror.i. the base year of 1~13'). Cenernl wholesale prices had to be uset1 as 
a basis for computation, houever, prior to 1953 due to the unavailab~lity of 
manufacturing price data. The data source w1s United ~:ations, Yearbook of Inter­
national Trade Statistics, various CTQtes. 
3. The above method of conversion is believed to be r.ore satisfactory than that 
· followed by Chcnery and others who convertecl nll domestic production into U.S. 
dollars at official exchange rates. In l~razil the lP.t ter rntes were typically 
either overvalued or unre.preser:tative due to r:ultiple cxchtm~e rates. 
4. Domestic production for individunl sectors Pa:::: in all instc..nces defined as 
gross output. '3ut nlthouph sross output :md value nuded p,rct: nt tlispnrate rates, 
the use of value added would not chan~e our r.1.1.i or findin~s. 
5. The caveat which applies to this ns well ns other 0,tt.1ntitntive studies of 
industrializatior. relates to the unreliability anc. covera~c of cl'.-:1tn on manu-
lfotitet'. fi.rr.t tc finis of 'Ci.v::, :.r i,1orc cr.1:-iloyees.facturinp.: i:..i<lustry. Covc::::a~:e L~ 
Thus, even during a census year significant amounts of production are excluded 
from measured output. 7-1oreover; e:x'.'.'.ept durinp census yecrs (every decade in 
• Brazil) data on industrial· prorJuctio'.1 iF derived fror.: or.ly n sar.1ple of firms 
(8060 of 40,790 total estimat1;•d in the year l.%3). The reJ..inbi.Hty of the data 
for even the covered firr.1s is open to serious question. ;;m.rever, ~;ince alternative 
means of estimation do not: exist t1!c ::iato. r.mst be used .::J.tlioui:,.;-. not without 
The best general c1iscrn::sior: 0~ ::L.:oL'..::.m~ s:~tistics is found 
in Baer. 
To test the f:cequently p0st1Jlc:ted assertion tiwt ·wst-tc:x i.ncor.1e Has redis-
tributed from consuminp, to 2.ntrenrelicun.1J. c1 ~sscs iL !;rrI:~i 1, a .".ir.iple TI~odc.l is 
developed here which relutes an 1.ncre:1se fr, indirect tnxes 1..'i.t:~ ar: incrense in 
saving. Let 
(1) ·s = s + s
t C e 
where St is total saving, S is entrepreneurial savine, and S is consumer snvinp.;.e C 
(2) S
C 
= (1-a) (cY - dTi) 
where for the consumin~ classes after tax savinr · is cleterminell by a (the average 
propensity to consume), c (the proportion of GiJP uhich it receives) and d (the 
proportion of indirect tnx, Ti). 
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(3) S = (1-b) [(1-c) Y] + uTi 
C 
\ 
where for the entrepreneurial class bis the cveragc propensity to consur.1e 2.r:.e 
dTi is assu;aeJ to be cor!plctcly savec Ly t!1e ~.ovcrrn:ient. T'.1ercfo:r0 
(4) S = (1-a) (cY - dTi) + (1-b) [(1-c) Y] + dTi 
t 
Values for the vr.riables based on Dr<"izilian r1;,tc1 ;ire innerte·cJ as follm·!S: 
a = • 9, b = . 7, c = •7 ~ and Y = 1(-~;-. v is chosen for cor'.VCr,ience. c t,,_,s ti1e actual 
share of consur.1er classes_ \'Dlues for c: 2nr! ~~re cl0rivec frm: ~ set of simul-
Two values uere selectu'. 
value 15, both of ~-1hich cor:::-espond to indire2ct ta:~cs h: th12 years 1950 :me 1960. 
The results are rather sur:>risi:i.?. The :=-ifty per cent increase in indirect 
taxes leads to an incre.:1s2 in totr :i .s.:1vi.i·P: n.s a pcrcenta:_:c of GT"'!' of only three 
per cent if d = .67 and only 2.25 per cent if d = .'.:>. 
Thus, even for these relativ~ly favorable vc1ues for the v8riables, the 
increase in saving is small, ar.d \•1 ou1t1 l>e sr,.::illcr still if tlte acknowledged 
pre-tax income shift over these year::; to \,2:,·e eDrners had been included. 
It is therefore perhapo not sun:,risinr: tiwt deopite the nuncrous arguments 
concerning uage lags nnd rer,ressive indirect taxes, neither marcincil nor total 
savings rose in I3razil curing the postwar years. Indirectly, these: findings sup-
port the hypothesis that entr.epreneurial classes·had a not much higher propensity 
to save than did the consunine classes. 
